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Stefano Bosi†, Eleni Iliopulos‡and Hubert Jayet§
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Abstract
In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in presence of a rival public
good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives
only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock
of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per
native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive
eﬀect oﬀsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. However, when we account for
the costs associated to cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows.
We also interpret the long-run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.
Keywords: heterogenous discounting, public good, immigration policy, cycles.
JEL Classification: D91, E32, H41, J61.
1 Introduction
"When a man migrates from the one country to another, he abandons his share of public property [...] in the
former country and acquires a share of public property in the latter [...] imposing a cost upon the original
residents of the country to which he goes [...]; however the"public property" eﬀect is contrasted with other
sources of costs and benefits of migration" (Usher, 1977).
The economic eﬀects of migration flows into developed economies have been widely analyzed by a rich
literature.1 Indeed, migration inflows are either beneficial or harmful depending upon manifold contingent
features of both host countries and immigration flows. As Nannestad (2006) suggests, one of the main issues
concerns the composition of migration flows. Clearly, in presence of adverse-selection eﬀects, migration flows
are not welfare improving.2 Secondly, the economic impact of immigrants depends on the extent and the
features of their absorption into the labor market.
Moreover, one of the most controversial issues of debate in Western countries concerns the economic drain
of immigrants on welfare-states social programs. While there is a general agreement on the fact that, if
immigrants are not absorbed in host-countries labor force, they are a burden on natives, little agreement has
been found on the eﬀects of perfectly absorbed and substitutable inflows of workers. In his article, Wildasin
(1994) provides a characterization of the income distribution frontier in host countries both in presence and in
absence of migration inflows; his static analysis shows that, if immigrants are beneficiaries of income transfers,
migration can lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes in all destination regions. Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2001)
∗We would like to thank two anonymous referee for their constructive criticisms. We acknowledge Cuong Le Van, Thomas
Seegmuller, Bertrand Wigniolle and the other participants to the GED seminar in Paris, and also Guido Cazzavillan, Rodolphe
Dos Santos Ferreira, Frédéric Dufourt and Francesco Magris for helpful comments. All errors are our own.
†Corresponding author. THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise. E-mail: stefano.bosi@u-cergy.fr.
‡PSE (Paris School of Economics), University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and CEPREMAP. E-mail: eleni.iliopulos@univ-
paris1.fr.
§EQUIPPE, University of Lille 1. E-mail: hubert.jayet@univ-lille1.fr.
1 See Borjas (1994) for a general discussion on welfare implications deriving from immigration. See Nannestad (2006) for a
focus on welfare implications of immigration when destination countries are welfare states.
2According to the "welfare magnets hypothesis" (Borjas, 1999b), generous welfare states could act as magnets for "bad"
immigrants.
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provide a more detailed focus on welfare policies; their analysis shows that the eﬀect of immigrants crucially
depends on public good provision and on how welfare policies are financed. When consumption tax revenues
finance the provision of a public good, marginal migration increases natives’ welfare in destination countries;
when the consumption tax is equally redistributed, marginal migration decreases the welfare of natives. More
ambiguous outcomes arise from tariﬀs revenue. However, their static analysis provides a one-shot picture
and does not allow for long term considerations. Using a similar framework in presence of internationally
mobile capital, Michael (2003) shows that income taxes and transfers can improve the welfare of natives even
if immigrants provide smaller tax revenues to the state; the hypothesis of international capital mobility is
thus crucial. The key role of capital is also stressed by Usher (1977); while his back-to-envelope calculations
suggest that immigrants cannot but be a drain on welfare states, he stresses the importance of a long-term
perspective.
In light of the above considerations, we focus on long-term optimal immigration policies in welfare states.
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium framework with capital accumulation. Indeed, another crucial
factor for evaluating the impact of migration flows into destination countries is the time perspective. Most
of the existing literature evaluating welfare eﬀects of immigration tends to see the phenomenon as a static
one; therefore, the focus is on a static comparison between pre and post-immigration welfare in the country.
These works generally find a significant increase in the post-immigration domestic output. More precisely,
according to Borjas (1999b), the "immigration surplus"3 is conditional upon the fact that at least some
natives see their wage decrease with respect to the pre-immigration situation. The extent of these eﬀects has
been questioned by using a dynamic framework. In a neoclassical growth model of overlapping dynasties,
Ben-Gad (2004) shows that both the benefits and the decrease of wages are much smaller; his elegant analysis
demonstrates that static models that do not incorporate endogenous capital accumulation, elastic labor supply
and transition paths, do overestimate the impact of immigration on both the distribution of income and the
welfare of natives.
In our exercise, we assume the perspective of a policy maker who aims at maximizing the long run welfare
of the native population. Her/his optimization program takes into account the arrival of foreign workforce:
its impact on natives’ incomes and on natives’ public-good consumption. As in Michael (2003), we suppose
that the government provides his citizens with a rival but non-excludible public good;4 marginal immigration
has thus a negative eﬀect on natives’ public-good utility. This eﬀect is however oﬀset by the contribution of
immigrants (who are also allowed for a degree of free riding) to government revenues. The determination of
the optimal immigration policy is linked to the determination of the optimal fiscal policy.
Optimal fiscal and immigration policies result from the incorporation of natives’ utility maximization
programs into the government welfare function; immigrants’ optimal decisions on saving and consumption
are also considered. Notice in particular that we account also for natives’ attitudes towards migration. Indeed,
the recent political debate in Europe shows that even if immigration flows have been for most countries "[...] a
boon for their economy, [...] hostility to immigration is becoming a mainstream [...]" (The Economist, 2008).
In support of this evidence, O’Rourke and Sinnot (2006) and Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002) stress that
natives’ preferences towards immigration are significantly aﬀected by nationalistic sentiments. On the other
hand, Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) remark the significance of immigrants’
assimilation resilience. These considerations suggest that the impact of foreign workforce on host countries
goes beyond issues related to income distribution; immigration inflows represent a cultural challenge for host
countries’ natives and, in this light, a disutility.5 In order to account for the disutility related to the cultural
challenge, we introduce cultural heterogeneity costs in natives’ utility function.
Our analysis aims at contributing to the actual debate on optimal immigration policies in the Western
world.6 It allows us to characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies. It shows that even if policy-makers
optimize the welfare of natives only and account for both the eﬀects of congestion (of public goods) and of
hostility towards immigrants, it is optimal to let (at least some) immigrants enter the country (by regulating
flows). The analysis also shows that, in absence of costs of cultural heterogeneity, it is optimal for natives to
let borders open. Indeed, because of the heterogeneous discounting, patient natives hold the entire stock of
3 It is defined as the diﬀerence between the post-immigration increase in output and the share of output earned by immigrants.
4Think for instance of public health and education: too many recipients of these services can negatively aﬀect the quality of
the service for them (congestion).
5Alternatively, according to Nannestad (2004), integration can be seen as a public good.
6Throughout the analysis, our assumptions will be based on a relatively conservative stand. Nonetheless, immigration results
to be optimal.
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capital in the long run, while the impatient immigrants work. Since capital intensity is stationary, capital per
native eventually increases with the number of (immigrant) workers; thus, in turn, natives’ consumption of
private and public good increases with their capital stock. This positive eﬀect oﬀsets the disutility deriving
from the congestion of the public good.
In order to account for the possibility of costs of cultural heterogeneity, we focus on homogeneous func-
tional forms; costs of cultural heterogeneity lead us to characterize an interior solution for frontier openness.
We show that an increase in the degree of intolerance has a negative eﬀect on the optimal number of im-
migrants, but, surprisingly, no eﬀects on the optimal fiscal policy. The impact of an increase in free riding
and on the immigration side of the optimal policy mix is not univocal and depends on the degree of substi-
tutability between the public and the private good in natives’ consumption: given the stronger contribution
of immigrants to the provision of the private good, the higher substitutability, the stronger the incentive to
let immigrants come in (even if the provision of the public good diminishes).
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model, while in the third we
define the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the optimal fiscal and immigration policies in
general. An example with explicit functional forms is studied in Section 5. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 6.
2 The model
In this article, we focus our attention on a rich welfare-state country. The country is populated by 1 identical
infinite-lived natives and 2 infinite-lived immigrants. For the purpose of contributing to the current debate
on migration policies, we will assume a relatively conservative stand; incorporating in our analysis elements
that are currently under discussion will indeed contextualize and remark the importance of our results.
We assume that when immigrants enter the country they do not dispose of (human or physical) capital;
however, once arrived in the destination country, they can choose to accumulate capital. Conversely, natives
are endowed with human and physical capital, but supply no (unskilled) labor.7 We also suppose that natives
are more patient than immigrants, i.e., they have a higher discount rate. This assumption is consistent with
data; indeed, as stressed by Lawrance (1991), rich individuals show higher discount rates that the poor ones.8
Finally, immigrants supply inelastically one unit of labor.
Both capital and labor are employed in the production of a privately provided consumption good; an
imperfect public good, which is non-excludible but rival, is also provided and consumed.
We assume that the policy maker of the domestic country is benevolent toward the native population
only; s/he maximizes a domestic welfare function that only accounts for natives’ utility. S/he chooses the
fiscal pressure (and thus, the amount of public good) and the number of immigrants to allow to enter the
country.
In the following, all variables referring to natives are labelled with 1; all variables referring to immigrants
are labeled with 2. In addition, ,  and  (referred to the th agent) denote respectively the amount of
capital, the consumption good and the public good. Both goods are produced with the same technology and,
therefore, have the same price (normalized to one for simplicity). Finally,  and  will denote the discount
factor and the utility function, respectively.
2.1 Firms
Suppose that in every period a competitive (representative) firm maximizes the profit  () −  − 
taking factor prices (the interest rate  and the wage rate ) and technology as given. Let  () ≡  ( 1),
7 In practice, we assume that the native population of Western developed countries is relatively more endowed of physical
and human capital. Here we could alternatively suppose that natives do also supply inelastically one unit of labor. As long as
the native’s capital endowment is suﬃciently large, this wouldn’t aﬀect our qualitative results.
8According to Fisher: "A small income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high rate of impatience, partly from
the thought that provision for the present is necessary both for the present itself and for the future as well, and partly from
lack of foresight and self-control" (Fisher 1930, p. 73). Time preference can also be related to religious and cultural factors.
Notice that in a two-country Ramsey model, discount factors heterogeneity among countries implies that in the long run the
most patient country attracts the whole stock of world capital. Thus, consumption in the other country tends to zero. The
country where inhabitants are the most patient ones is thus, ex post, the richest. This result would be mitigated by presence of
credit constraints (see, among others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003)).
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where  ≡  is capital intensity. The constant return to scale production function  () satisfies
additional neoclassical features.
Assumption 1 (technology)  is homogeneous of degree 1 with  ∈ 2,   0,   0,  
 2 for every () such that   0.
Assumption 2 (Inada) Moreover,  (0) = 0, lim→0  0 () = +∞ and lim→+∞  0 () = 0.
Under Assumption 1, profit maximization requires
 =  0 () ≡  () (1)
 =  ()−  0 () ≡  () (2)
Second-order restrictions for profit maximization are also satisfied under Assumption 1.
The following elasticities summarize the technological features and will play a role in the sequel:
 () ≡ 
0 ()
 () = −
1−  ()
 ()  0 (3)
 () ≡ 
0 ()
 () =
 ()
 ()  0 (4)
where  () ≡  0 ()  () ∈ (0 1) is the capital share in total income and  () ≡ [ ()− 1]  0 ()  [ 00 ()] 
0 is the elasticity of capital-labor substitution.9
2.2 Consumers
We focus now the attention on the inhabitants of the host country. The country is populated both by natives
and immigrants; both types of agents choose their optimal consumption levels, given their own budget
constraint. Notice in particular that agents’ utility depends on consumption levels of both the consumption
good — that is produced by firms — and on the public good — provided by the government.
Consider first the perspective of native citizens. Their utility function positively depends on the con-
sumption good (1) and on public good levels (1). The arrival of newcomers entails a cultural challenge.
In order to proxy for the disutility associated to it, we have introduced costs of cultural heterogeneity into
their utility function. We assume that this disutility is a positive function of the number of foreigners (2)
in total population (1 + 2). This assumption is supported by historical considerations. Indeed, when in
1913 this ratio reached its peak (15%) in US, hostility to immigration pushed the population to demand (and
eventually obtain) tough limits on migration that slowed the inflow for decades (The Economist, 2008).10
More precisely, in order to capture the increasing hostility associated to a larger amount of newcomers in total
population, we introduce convex subjective costs of cultural heterogeneity, . Natives solve the program:
max
(1+11)∞=0
∞X
=0
1
£1 (1 1)−  ()¤
subject to their budget constraint.
We denote by
 ≡ 21 + 2 ∈ (0 1) (5)
the share of immigrants in total population; it represents a measure of cultural diversity. We will show in
the following that the density of immigrants (5) plays a role in public decision making.
We denote by   11 the discount factor associated to the costs of cultural heterogeneity; it captures
the evolution of hostility over time. Diversity costs are a positive function of the number of newcomers but
9When  is constant, the technology is Cobb-Douglas. When  is constant, the technology is CES (Constant Elasticity of
Substitution).
10The evidence of Canada and US southern states shows also that for high levels of the ratio foreigners/total population, the
national language of a country can also be challenged: the higher the ratio, the tougher the cultural challenge.
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decrease during time as soon as immigrants gradually mix with the native population. Notice however, that
this does not necessarily imply that immigrants are assimilated over time (i.e. converge) to natives. Indeed,
while recent empirical evidence on the state of New York shows that hostility is only addressed towards recent
immigration inflows, the melting-pot assimilation pattern has proved wrong (Bisin and Verdier, 2000). More
generally, the case of an increasing negative bias towards immigrants is captured by   1, while   11
ensures the convergence of the series.
Natives are subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
1 + 1+1 − (1− ) 1 ≤ (1− ) 1
where  is the constant tax rate and  is the depreciation rate, with 10  0. We assume therefore that
natives have positive initial endowments of capital. Indeed, capital should be here interpreted as physical,
financial but also as human capital. Therefore, starting from the first period, natives do supply a positive
quantity of (physical and human) capital.
We now focus the attention on the latecomer population. We suppose that all immigrants have access
to both the consumption good and the public good;11 however, in order to capture phenomena such as
clandestine immigration and black labor-market networks, we allow immigrants to contribute only partially
to government revenues. Clearly, if latecomers can enjoy the provision of public goods without paying for
them, this creates a potential free-riding problem for welfare states.12
We denote by  ∈ [0 1] the degree of participation to government’s public expenditure; equivalently, the
free-riding degree is represented by 1 − . Clearly, one of these possibilities may arise: (1)  = 1 (citizens
and immigrants pay the same tax rate), (2)   1 (free riding). The utility of immigrants positively depends
on the consumption good, 2, and on the public good, 2, i.e., they solve the program:
max
(2+12)∞=0
∞X
=0
22 (2 2)
under a sequence of budget constraints:
2 + 2+1 − (1− ) 2 ≤ (1− ) (2 + )
with 20 = 0, implying that when immigrants enter the country they have no capital. However, once entered
the country, it is possible for them to enjoy greater incomes and start accumulating (human and physical)
capital.
We introduce standard assumptions on the structure of preferences.
Assumption 3 (preferences)  ∈ 2,   0,   0,   0,   2 and lim→0  ( ) =
lim→0  ( ) = +∞ for every ( ) with    0. In addition,  ∈ 2,   0, 0  0, 00 ≥ 0 for
every   0.
In what follows, we introduce debt limits. More in particular, we assume for simplicity that both immi-
grants and natives cannot have access to credit. It is possible to show that in the long-run equilibrium the
debt limit is binding only for immigrants (see the discussion in the sequel).13 This equilibrium result is con-
sistent with reality. Indeed, given that access to credit market is strongly related to the value of collaterals,14
immigrants have a limited access to the credit market.
Assumption 4 (borrowing constraints)  ≥ 0 for  = 1 2 and  = 0 1   
11Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) show that, if illegal immigrants can be excluded from the redistribution of public services, it
is optimal for the host country to impose a zero quota for legal immigration and spending nothing to enforce it, letting therefore
illegal immigrants enter the country.
12 Schultz and Sjöström (2001) propose the accumulation of public debt as a possible tool to mitigate the free-rider problem.
Indeed, if the public good is financed by local debt, immigrants will eventually need to pay it by sharing the debt burden.
Their two-periods analysis shows that in equilibrium there will be either too much debt or too little public good; this policy
recommendation is far from being optimal.
13 In equilibrium, this assumption (together with discounting heterogeneity) is equivalent to imposing debts limits on immi-
grants only.
14For some discussion and empirical evidence, see, among others, IMF (2008).
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In additions agents are heterogenous: immigrants discount future more.
Assumption 5 (heterogeneous discounting) 1 2 ∈ (0 1),  ∈ (0 11) and
2 
∙
1−  + 1− 
1− 
µ
1
1 − 1 + 
¶¸−1
(6)
Assumptions 4 and 5 are important and deserve some comments. Unlike the case with one representative
agent, discounting heterogeneity gives rise to borrowing transactions. Borrowing allows impatient agents to
tilt consumption toward the present and, when labor supply is elastic, to shift labor eﬀort towards the future.
Thus, in absence of debt limits, their consumption vanishes asymptotically in the long run.15 Conversely, in
presence of borrowing constraints, debt accumulation is limited; there exists thus a stationary state where the
consumption level of impatient agents is positive. Under borrowing constraints, persistent cycles also arise.
Stationary and non-stationary equilibria are characterized in the seminal contribution by Becker (1980) and
Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), and in Sorger (1994).
Focus now on condition (6).
(1) It generalizes the basic restriction in Becker (1980): indeed, the original assumption 2  1 is
recovered, by setting  = 1 (no free riding).
(2) It imposes a restriction on free riding, given 1 2. Indeed, we can rewrite inequality (6) in terms of, i.e.:
  1
∙
1− (1− ) 12 − 1 + 
11 − 1 + 
¸
≡ ∗
(3) It implies discounting heterogeneity. Indeed ∗  1 implies 2  1.
Assumption 6 (participation degree)   max {∗ 1−  (1− )}.
Assumption 6 reduces to   ∗ if inputs are suﬃciently substitutable (  1− ).
Notice finally that the above assumptions have important implications for immigrants’ capital endowments
as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-5, if 10 is suﬃciently close to the steady state value (expression (19)
below), then 2 = 0, for every  ≥ 0.
Under inequality (6), the patient agents (the natives) hold the entire stock of capital in the long run,
while the impatient agents (the immigrants) need to work. As shown by Becker (1980), the heterogenous
discounting (i.e. the diﬀerent degree of impatience) determines the emergence of a "dominant consumer",
(that is, a class of capitalists). Notice that, even if immigrants enter the country and finish their life with no
capital holdings, they could a priori choose to hold it during at least one period of their life.
Proof. The basic proof is in Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987, 1994). For a formal proof in a model
with elastic labor supply, see also Bosi and Seegmuller (2010). In order to ensure the existence of a dominant
consumer under free-riding (  1), we generalize Becker’s restriction 2  . Comparing the Euler equation
of the patient agent, i.e.:
1 (1 1)
1 (1+1 1+1) = 1 [1−  + (1− ) +1] (7)
with that of the impatient agent:
2 (2 2)
2 (2+1 2+1) = 2 [1−  + (1− ) +1]
15Few authors have focused on Ramsey models with heterogeneous discounting and without market imperfections. See Le
Van and Vailakis (2003) for a model with inelastic labor supply and Le Van, Nguyen and Vailakis (2007) for a model with elastic
labor supply.
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we require at the stationary equilibrium:
2 [1−  + (1− ) ]  1 [1−  + (1− ) ] = 1
Solving for  the equation on the right-hand side and substituting  in the inequality on the left-hand side,
we get the inequality (6) in Assumption 5.
In the following, we will focus only on the equilibria around the steady state. In this case, Proposition
1 simplifies the immigrants’ optimization program. It states that immigrants’ relative impatience prompts
them not to hold capital. Moreover, in every period, immigrants consume only and completely their labor
income, i.e.:
2 = (1− ) (8)
We thus now shift the attention towards the optimization problem of the native population. Under
Assumptions 3-5, natives’ optimization program entails an Euler equation:
1 (1 1)
1 (1+1 1+1) = 1 [1−  + (1− ) +1]
a binding budget constraint:
1 + 1+1 = [1−  + (1− ) ] 1 (9)
and a transversality condition: lim→+∞ 11 (1 1) 1+1 = 0, which will be satisfied in a neighborhood
of the steady state (since 1  1).
Notice finally that the representative citizen’s capital depends on the capital intensity as follows:
1 = 21 =

1−  (10)
It is worthy to stress the diﬀerence between the capital intensity  and the capital 1 owned by the
natives. The former determines the price of factors, while the latter aﬀects the demand for goods through the
natives’ budget constraint: 1 + 1+1 = [1−  + (1− ) ] 1. The mechanisms at work on the producer’s
and the consumer’s sides are diﬀerent. When 1 6= 2 the diﬀerence between  and 1 in equation (10)
matters.
2.3 Government
Assume now the perspective of a benevolent government who chooses the optimal (fiscal and immigration)
policy by taking into account the welfare of citizens only. Given that immigrants do not vote, we have
realistically supposed that the policy maker is not influenced by their preferences.
Since the public good is rival but non-excludible, the individual amounts consumed by citizens and
immigrants are the same, i.e.:
1 = 2 = 
(1 + 2) (11)
where  is the aggregate public good, financed through the tax receipt:
 =  (11 + 2) (12)
and  ∈ [0 1] is the degree of rivality of the public good: according to the well-known definition of Samuelson,
the public good is pure when  = 0 while it is fully rival when  = 1.
By substituting (12) in (11) and using (10), we obtain:
1 = 2 =  ( + ) (1 + 2)1− (13)
The government maximizes a welfare function that corresponds with natives’ utility function. Indeed,
s/he takes into account their best replies by incorporating the equilibrium prices  (  2) and  (  2), and
the equilibrium quantities  =  (  2) and 1 = 1 (  2) into her/his maximization program, i.e.:
7
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 (  2)
≡
∞X
=0
1
£1 (1 1)−  ()¤
=
∞X
=0
11
³
1 (  2)   [ (  2)  (  2) +  (  2)] (1 + 2)1−
´
−
∞X
=0
(1)  ()
(14)
with respect to the fiscal policy  and the immigration policy 2. The share of immigrants  depends on the
choice variable 2 according to definition (5).
3 Equilibrium
The mechanisms that lead the system to equilibrium are based on the following timing:
(1) The government commits itself to a policy-mix, i.e. to a fiscal pressure  and to allowing 2 immigrants
to enter.
(2) Citizens and immigrants maximize their respective utility functions.
(3) Markets clear.
3.1 Equilibrium in the labor market
We have assumed for simplicity that natives provide both human and physical capital; at the same time,
immigrants provide (unskilled) labor. As above mentioned, as long as natives provide more human capital
than labor, qualitative results wouldn’t change if we allowed also natives to provide labor. In equilibrium,
total labor coincides thus with the number of immigrants, i.e.,  = 2.
Notice finally that we have implicitly assumed that all 2 individuals are willing to migrate from their
source country. We suppose in practice that immigrants’ wage in their source country is lower than the one
they receive in the destination country (for simplicity, we assume that their reservation wage is equal to zero)
and labor supply is inelastic; therefore, they always find profitable to migrate.
3.2 Equilibrium in the goods market
Aggregate demand is the sum of aggregate consumption, investment and public spending; in each period, it
is equal to aggregate production:
11 + 22 + 1 [1+1 − (1− ) 1] + = 2 () (15)
By substituting (8), (10), (12) in (15), we obtain  +  =  (), due to the homogeneity of the
production function (Assumption 1). In other words, firm’s technology, (1)-(2), and the lack of pure profit
ensure the equilibrium in the goods market.
3.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
By replacing (1), (2), (10), (13) in the Euler equation (7) and in natives’ budget constraint (9), we obtain
the following two-dimensional dynamic system in the pair ( 1).  is a predetermined variable, while 1
is a jump variable.
1
³
1  [ ()  +  ()] (1 + 2)1−
´
1
³
1+1  [ (+1) +1 +  (+1)] (1 + 2)1−
´ = 1 [1−  + (1− )  (+1)]
(16)
[1−  + (1− )  ()]2 = 11 + 2+1
(17)
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3.4 Steady state
It is now possible to compute the steady state. The stationary interest rate is determined by the Euler
equation (16):
 = 11 − 1 + 
1−  (18)
which in turn determines capital intensity:
 () ≡ −1
µ
11 − 1 + 
1− 
¶
(19)
We notice that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the non-zero steady state is unique.
(19), jointly with (10), gives the individual capital level:
1 (  2) ≡ 21  () (20)
Natives’ budget constraint (17) gives their consumption level:
1 (  2) ≡ 1− 11
2
1  () (21)
while (13) the individual provision of public good:
1 (  2) = 2 (  2) ≡  [ ( ())  () +  ( ())] 2
(1 + 2) (22)
The private/public good ratio,
1
1 =
1− 

(1 + 2)
1
1− 1
1− 1 (1− )

+ (1− ) (23)
will play an important role in the following.
In order to obtain parametric solutions for 1, 1, 1, simply replace (19) in (20), (21) and (22), respectively.
Notice that neither aggregate capital nor the interest rate depend on the number of immigrants; to the
contrary, the individual consumption levels of both the private and the public good are increasing functions
of 2.
3.5 Comparative statics
In order to shed light on the long-run eﬀects of fiscal and immigration policies we now focus on their impact
on the steady state; we thus compute the following elasticities with respect to the policy parameters, (  2).
Let us denote with  ≡ ()  the partial elasticity of variable  with respect to variable . The
following proposition characterizes the sign of these elasticities.
Proposition 2 The elasticities of the steady state values with respect to the policy parameters have the
following signs:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
 21 121 121 12
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
− 1− 1− ( 0) 0− 1− 1− ( 0) 1− 1− 1− ( 0) 1
1− 1− 1− +(1−)+−1+(1−)
¡
Q 0
¢
1−  (∈ (0 1])
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (24)
Thus, 1  0 if and only if   ¯ , where, under Assumption 6,
¯ ≡ (1− ) + (1− ) + (1− ) ∈ (0 1) (25)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We observe that, according to (3), the tax rate has a positive eﬀect on the interest rate and a negative
eﬀect on both the capital intensity and consumption, independently of the immigration policy. Moreover,
(as expected from an inspection of the steady state) the number of immigrants, 2, has no eﬀect on capital
intensity but has a positive impact both on private consumption and the provision of the public good.
9
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4 Natives-oriented policy
We now focus on government’s optimization program. As stated above, s/he only accounts for the welfare
of native citizens (see expression (14)); in practice, while deciding over fiscal and immigration policies, s/he
neglects immigrants’ welfare. Indeed, for the purpose of optimizing natives’ long-run welfare, s/he maximizes
the welfare function (14) evaluated at the steady state, with respect to the policy (  2), i.e.:
 (  2) = 1 (1 1)
1− 1 −
 ()
1− 1 (26)
In order to justify such a benevolent attitude towards natives, we can assume that the government is
elected by native citizens only or that natives are more involved in politics than immigrants.16
We notice that 1 and 1 are functions of (  2) (see equations (21) and (22)). According to (26), the
welfare evaluated at the steady state is in turn a function of (  2):
 (  2) = 1 (1 (  2)  1 (  2))
1− 1 −
 ()
1− 1
where  depends on 2 according to (5).
We compute the gradient of the welfare function:

 =
1
1− 1
µ1
1
1
 1 +
1
1
1
 1
¶
(27)

2 =
1
1− 1
µ1
1
1
2 12 +
1
1
1
2 12
¶
− 1
(1 + 2)2
0
1− 1 (28)
where 1 , 12 , 1 , 12 are given by (24).
We have assumed for simplicity that the government does not announce an optimal non-stationary policy
(  2)∞∗=0 , but commits itself to implement a constant policy over time.17
In the following, we first characterize the optimal fiscal policy for a given immigration policy; then, we
compute the optimal immigration policy for a given fiscal policy. Finally, we will consider the optimal policy
mix in the simple case of Cobb-Douglas technology and preferences.
4.1 Optimal fiscal policy
Equations (27) and (28) allow us to focus on optimal fiscal and immigration policies, respectively. We first
concentrate our attention on the optimal fiscal policy. As shown in the next proposition, equation (27)
determines the optimal level of taxation, for a given immigration policy.
Proposition 3 Given the immigration policy 2, the optimal fiscal pressure is given by
∗ = ¯
µ
1 + ¯ 
1− 
11
11
¶−1
(29)
where ¯ is given by (25), and 11 , 11 are the elasticity of utility with respect to the private and the public
good, respectively. Under Assumption 6, ∗ ∈ (0 1).
16 It is interesting to observe that in France the share of immigrants in the parliament is lower than the one in the population;
it is close to zero for communities resorting from Africa.
17Clearly, the solution ( 2)∗ is time-consistent at the steady state, i.e., if the economic system is at the steady state from
the beginning. Indeed, the objective (26) is invariant over time (since (1 1) are invariant) so that the optimal solution does
not change over time.
However, when initial conditions are outside the steady state, one may question whether the optimal sequence computed
at  + 1:  0 02
∞∗
=+1, is in general the consistent continuation of the sequence announced at time : ( 2)∞∗=, (that is 0 02

= ( 2) for every   ), and also whether a constant policy announced at time : ( 2)∞∗=+1, is consistent with
the optimal sequence at time + 1:  0 02
∞∗
=+1, (that is
 0 02

= ( 2)).
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Proof. By substituting (24) in (27), we obtain:  ≥ 0 iﬀ  ≤ ∗. Then, the maximum of  is global at
∗. Moreover, Assumption 6 entails ¯ ∈ (0 1) and, therefore, ∗ ∈ (0 1) since 1111  0.
Notice that ¯ is a critical value: indeed, a taxation degree beyond ¯ implies a negative eﬀect (a reversal)
on the individual provision of public good (1  0: see Proposition 2).
We consider an explicit functional form so as to provide more explicit policy recommendations. Focus on
the case of a homogeneous utility function of degree 1− 1:
1 (1 1) ≡  (1 1)
1−1
1− 1 if  6= 1; 1 (1 1) ≡ ln (1 1) if  = 1 (30)
where  is a positive function homogeneous of degree one, while 1 is homogeneous of degree 1−1. Notice
that  can be interpreted as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of a composite good .
The homogeneity of the utility (30) implies that the private consumption share in the composite good 
depends only on the ratio private/public good:  =  (11), where  and 11 are explicitly given by (18)
and (23). Simple computations yield:
11 =  − 1 
µ 1
1
¶
(31)
11 =  − 1
∙
1− 
µ 1
1
¶¸
(32)
We obtain thus:
∗ = ¯
∙
1 + ¯ 
1− 
 (11)
1−  (11)
¸−1
(33)
where  = 1 is the private consumption share in the composite good, which is a function of the
private/public good ratio (23).
4.2 Optimal immigration policy
We now shift our attention to the optimal immigration policy under a given fiscal policy. We will first consider
the case of costless cultural heterogeneity; we will then shift our attention to the case of heterogeneity cultural
costs. Notice that, in the first scenario, we obtain very general results; indeed, they do not depend on specific
functional forms for the fundamentals.
4.2.1 Costless cultural heterogeneity
In this section we aim to disentangle the impact of public-good congestion and immigrants’ free riding on
natives’ welfare. In particular, we study whether the congestion of public good coupled with free riding in
immigrants’ fiscal participation represents a suﬃcient economic argument to limit the openness of frontiers
(and to introduce thus immigration quotas).
Our results show that, in absence of costs of cultural heterogeneity, the optimal immigration policy
consists in opening borders. Surprisingly, this result holds for any degree  of impureness of the public good.
Indeed, natives’ gains coming from immigrants’ labor force more than oﬀset the disutility deriving from the
congestion of the public good. This finding is far from trivial and is formalized in the following proposition;
it can indeed be considered one of the main results of our work.
Proposition 4 With no costs of cultural heterogeneity ( = 0), 2  0.
Proof. According to (24) and (28), we have

2 =
1
1− 1
∙1
1
1
2 +
1
1
1
2 (1− )
¸
 0 (34)
because, under Assumptions 3, marginal utilities are strictly positive.
Notice that, for a given  , neither the stationary state  nor  depend on 2 (see (18)). However, individual
wealth 1 = 21, current and future consumption 1 = [(1− )  − ] 21 and the provision of public
good 1 =  ( + ) (1 + 2)1− are all positive functions of 2. Thus, the presence of immigrants has
a positive impact on welfare.
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4.2.2 Costly cultural heterogeneity
In presence of costs of cultural heterogeneity, (34) needs to be generalized so as to account for hostility
towards immigrants. Equation (26) is now the welfare function we need to maximize with respect to 2. By
replacing (24) in (28), we obtain:
2 2 =
1
1− 1 [11 + (1− ) 11 ]−

1− 1 (1− )  (35)
where  () ≡ 0 ()  () is the elasticity of the costs of cultural heterogeneity with respect to share of
foreigners.
Consider now the case of homogeneous utility function. Substituting (31) and (32) in (35) gives
2 2 =
1−1
1− 1 [1−  (1− )]−

1− 1 (1− )  (36)
where  =  (1 1) and  =  (11). Welfare maximization requires 2 = 0.
4.2.3 Results interpretation
Costless cultural heterogeneity Broadly speaking, one could explain the need for immigrants on the
ground of capital-labor complementarity. Having said that, the crucial mechanism driving the dynamics of
the system in our model is the following: in the long run, patient natives hold the entire stock of capital,
while impatient immigrants only work. Capital intensity is stationary and thus, capital per native increases
with the number of (immigrant) workers. In turn, natives’ consumption of private and public good increases
with their capital stock. This positive eﬀect more than oﬀsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of
the public good.
Notice thus that the Beckerian feature of heterogenous discounting is the dominant mechanism at work. It
is at the roots of the resulting social segmentation; it also ensures significant gains of welcoming immigrants,
even in presence of a strongly rival public good. Therefore, if citizens are not hostile to immigrants (no
costs of cultural heterogeneity) but the government considers natives’ welfare only (neglecting the welfare of
immigrants) and the public good is rival (congestion costs), the optimal policy consists in letting frontiers
completely open. Things change if people are hostile to foreigners: in this case, the degree of openness
depends on the degree of intolerance.
Finally, we also observe that 2 decreases with . This allows us to provide an additional (somehow
obvious) result: the purer the public good (i.e., the smaller the congestion costs), the stronger the positive
impact of migrants on natives’ welfare.
Costly cultural heterogeneity Welfare maximization requires an arbitrage between physical wealth and
cultural hostility. Indeed, according to (36), 2 = 0 if and only if
1−1
1− 1
µ
1 + [1−  (1− )] 
1− 
¶
=

1− 1
Therefore, the optimal immigration policy is the result of an arbitrage between the benefits of a larger
number of newcomers, resulting in a higher level of capital per native (left-hand side), and the costs associated
to hostility (right-hand side).
4.3 Local dynamics
We now provide some economic intuitions about the equilibrium dynamic properties and the occurrence of
endogenous fluctuations. We focus in particular on the destabilizing power of black-labor market through
informal arguments.18
As shown by Becker and Foias (1994), heterogenous discounting promotes the occurrence of endogenous
cycles under weak elasticity of capital-labor substitution . More precisely, Becker and Foias prove that there
18These considerations are supported by computations that are available upon request.
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exists a critical value ∗  0 such that (1) if   ∗, the steady state is a saddle-point, (2) if   ∗, the
steady state is a source surrounded by a two-period cycle or a 2-period cycle with   1. Generically, the
system undergoes a flip bifurcation at  = ∗.
Our model relies on the assumption of heterogeneous discounting and inherits the dynamic properties of
Becker and Foias (1994). Linearizing the system (16)-(17) and computing the characteristic polynomial gives
the critical value ∗ of flip bifurcation. One can show that if the consumption good and the public good
are substitutes or weakly complements, then ∗  0: as in Becker and Foias (1994) the system generically
undergoes a flip bifurcation at  = ∗. The transitional equilibrium is unique in the case of saddle point
(  ∗). Indeed,  is a predetermined variable, while 1 is a jump variable in the two-dimensional system
(16)-(17). The equilibrium is also unique in the case of source (  ∗) when the cycle around is supercritical.
Thus, economies where inputs are suﬃciently complements can experience endogenous cycles.
One may wonder whether any fundamental parameter aﬀects the size of the instability region (0 ∗).
We reinterpret free riding 1−  as the relative extent of the black labor in the total labor market. When
the composite good  is Cobb-Douglas, it is possible to prove that the extent of the black-labor market
promotes the occurrence of cycles and destabilizes the economy (1−  widens the instability region (0 ∗)),
if and only if the private and public good are complements.19
The following can explain the economic intuition. When   1, public and private goods are complements
and the intertemporal substitution dominates the income eﬀect. If  increases, capital income also increases
at time , entailing both an increase in tax revenues and public good provision. Because of the comple-
mentarity between 1 and 1, we observe also an increase in private consumption. This eventually reduces
investment and thus +1 (due to the budget constraint). The negative impact of  on +1 is amplified
by the black-labor market (i.e., by the free riding). When free riding matters, the provision of public good
mostly weights on natives’ capital income: the higher the contribution of capital income to the provision of
the public good, the stronger the eﬀect.
5 The Cobb-Douglas case
We have computed the optimal fiscal policy, given the number of immigrants, and the optimal immigration
policy, given the tax rate. We now compute the optimal policy mix and maximize thus the welfare function
(26) jointly with respect to  and 2. In order to characterize the optimal policy mix, in what follows we
introduce Cobb-Douglas technology and preferences.
Assumption 7 (technology) The production function is Cobb-Douglas:
 () ≡ 1− (37)
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the capital share in total income  ∈ (0 1) is constant and the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution is  = 1. The average and marginal productivities become respectively  () = 
and  = −1. Solving (19) gives the capital intensity at the steady state:
 =
∙  (1− )
11 − 1 + 
¸ 1
1−
(38)
Focus now on consumers’ preferences.
Assumption 8 (preferences) The composite good is Cobb-Douglas:
 (1 1) ≡ 1 1−1 (39)
19Complementarity means that the consumption of public good increases the marginal utility of private good and viceversa.
This happens if and only if   1.
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Notice that  is now a weighted geometric average of both the private and public good; the interpretation
of  as composite good is thus appropriate.
The Cobb-Douglas technology implies  = 1. At the same time, Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that ,
the private consumption share in the composite good , does no longer depend on the ratio private/public
good,  (11) = .
5.1 Optimal policy mix
In order to compute the optimal policy mix (∗ ∗2) we proceed by solving the welfare maximization problem.
In the following, we will first study the role of the fiscal policy and then the one of the immigration policy.
5.1.1 Fiscal policy in the optimal mix
The following proposition represents the fiscal side of the optimal policy mix.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 7 and 8, the tax rate of the optimal policy mix is given by
∗ = (1− ) (1− ) (40)
Proof. Since  = 1 and  (11) = , (25) simplifies to ¯ ≡ (1− ) and (33) to (40). Eventually, we notice
that ∗ is independent from the number of immigrants 2. Thus, ∗ corresponds also with the optimal-mix
taxation level.
The above proposition implies that the stronger the preference for the public good (1 − ), the greater
the tax rate and the provision of public good. Moreover, the larger the capital share in total income, the
lower the taxation on capital income (natives’ income). Surprisingly, the latter does not depend on other
parameters than the public good share in the composite good and the capital share.
5.1.2 Immigration policy in the optimal mix
Costless cultural heterogeneity In absence of heterogeneity costs, the presence of immigrants has a
positive impact on welfare (see Proposition (4)). This conclusion is general and does not depend on the
adoption of Cobb-Douglas fundamentals. In addition, it holds for any level of taxation and, so, for what
concerns the optimal policy mix.
Costly cultural heterogeneity When cultural heterogeneity entails a disutility, Cobb-Douglas technology
and preferences allow us to find explicit solutions.
Under the production function (37), the capital share in total income  is constant. Under the utility
function (39), the consumption share  in the composite good is also constant and does no longer depend on
the ratio 11.
We now specify natives’ disutility deriving from cultural heterogeneity. For simplicity, we consider a linear
function. In fact, introducing convexity would not change the qualitative properties of the optimal policy
mix.
Assumption 9 (cultural cost) The cost of cultural heterogeneity is linear:
 () ≡  (41)
where  can be interpreted as a degree of intolerance.
Assumption 9 entails  = 1. Replacing (21), (39), (41) in (36), we find

2 =
 ( )
(1− 1)2
where
 ( ) ≡  [1− (1− ) ]−  (1− )  (42)
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.95
with
 ≡ 1
1− 1
1− 1  0
and
 ≡
"
1
1− 1
1− 

µ 1
1
¶1−#1− 1
(43)
where 11 and  are now given respectively by (23) and (38).
(1) Case  = 1 (logarithmic utility).
When  = 1 the private and the public good are neither substitutes nor complements in the individual
basket of consumption.
The following proposition determines the critical degree of intolerance beyond which the government
decides to introduce immigration quotas.
Proposition 6 Let Assumptions 4-9 be satisfied. We introduce the following critical values:
∗ ≡ 1 + (1− ) 
2
−
s∙
1 + (1− ) 
2
¸2
−  (44)
∗ ≡ 1− 1
1− 1
[(1− ) ]2
2− (1− ) − 2p1− (1− )   0 (45)
(a) If   ∗ (low natives’ cultural aversion), it is optimal to open the borders to newcomers.
(b) If   ∗ (high cultural aversion), the optimal density of immigrants is given by ∗ ∈ (0 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 belongs in this sense to case (a) in Proposition 6. Indeed,  = 0  ∗.
Focus on (44) and (45). We notice that:
(i) ∗  0 and ∗  0: the more rival the public good, the less tolerant the natives.
(ii) ∗ (1− )  0 and ∗ (1− )  0: the stronger the preference for a rival public good (  0),
the less tolerant the natives.
(iii) ∗  0: the higher the weight on cultural disutility, the less tolerant the natives.
(iv) Because  = 1, neither the tax rate () nor the free riding (1− ) nor the capital share () aﬀect the
optimal density of immigrants ∗ or the critical degree of tolerance ∗.
We know that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimal tax rate ∗ does no longer depend on 2 (see (40)).
In addition, when  = 1, the optimal immigration density ∗ does no longer depend on the tax rate  (see
(44)). Since 2 = 1 (1− ), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7 Under the Assumptions 4-9 and  = 1, the optimal policy mix is
∗ = (1− ) (1− )
∗2 = 1 
∗
1− ∗
where the optimal share of immigrants ∗ is given by (44).
(2) General case  6= 1.
For simplicity, we consider a fully rival public good:  = 1.
By replacing (40) in (23) and (38), and substituting (23) and (38) in (43), we get
 () ≡
"
1
1− 1
1− 

µ
11 − 1 + 
 [1− (1− ) (1− )]
¶ 1
1− µ 1
1
¶1−#1− 1
with 1
1 =
1
1− 
1− (1− ) (1− )
(1− ) (1− )
1− 1
1− 1 (1− )

+ (1− )
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where we have taken into account the optimal fiscal policy (40).
The optimal immigration density ∗ is the solution of the following equation:
 ( ) ≡  [1− (1− ) ]−  (1− )  () = 0 (46)
Diﬀerentiating (46) with respect to  and a given parameter  allows us to compute the partial derivative
∗ and the partial elasticity:
∗ ≡ ∗
∗

We have studied above the role of  (rivality in the consumption of public good) and 1 −  (preference
for the public good) in the case  = 1. Let us now focus on the impact of ,  and  in the more general
case  6= 1. By totally diﬀerentiating (46) with respect to , ,  and , we find the following elasticities:
∗ = − (∗) 1− (1− ) 
∗
∗
∗ = − (∗) 1− (1− ) 
∗
∗
1
1− 1
∗ = (1− ) (1− ∗)  (∗)  (∗)  − 1
(1− )
+ (1− )
where
 (∗) ≡
∙
(1− ) +  () 1−  (1− +  + )
¸−1
In order to be able to interpret these results, we introduce a suitable assumption.
Assumption 10 0  ∗  (1− +  + )−1  1.
Assumption 10 allows us to study the role of free riding when the optimal share of immigrants ∗ is not
too significant. When for instance  is close to one, Assumption 10 becomes 0  ∗  12 .
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 10, (1) ∗  0 and ∗  0. In addition, (2) ∗  0 if and only if
  1.
Proof. Assumption 10 implies  (∗)  0. Results follow immediately.
Let us provide some economic intuition.
(2.1) ∗  0 and ∗  0. As expected, an increase in the degree of intolerance towards immigrants
(either  or ) has a negative impact on the optimal immigration policy: the stronger the intolerance, the
lower the number of welcomed immigrants.
(2.2) ∗  0 if and only if   1. An increase in fiscal participation has a positive impact on the
optimal number of immigrants if and only if   1.20 Indeed, an increase in free riding (1 − ) has always
a negative eﬀect on the provision of the public good. When goods are complements (  1), this entails in
turn a decrease in the marginal utility of private-good consumption; therefore, a decrease in the number of
immigrant workers is required for the production of both goods. To the contrary, if goods are substitutes
(  1), a decrease in the provision of public good rises the marginal utility of the private good and incentives
its production. The increased production of private good more than oﬀsets the reduction of public good;
thus, the optimal number of (welcomed) immigrant workers increases.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we have characterized optimal fiscal and immigration policies in a dynamic framework of
general equilibrium. We have accounted for the possibility of free riding in immigrants’ contribution to
government revenues and for natives’ intolerance towards immigrants. We have assumed the perspective of
a government who provides a rival public good and maximizes the welfare of natives only.
20As discussed above, when   1 the private and the public good are complements in the individual basket of consumption
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Our work proves that, in absence of costs of cultural heterogeneity, it is optimal to keep frontiers open; on
the other hand, in presence of costs of cultural heterogeneity, the optimal immigration policy is an interior
solution. Indeed, in the log run, heterogenous discounting results in social segmentation between native
capitalists and immigrant workers; moreover, a larger number of newcomers implies in turn higher levels of
capital and consumption per native, even in presence of a rival public good.
We have characterized analytically the optimal policy mix under Cobb-Douglas fundamentals. Surpris-
ingly, the degree of intolerance and the degree of rivality of the public good do not aﬀect the optimal taxation.
Indeed, while the degree of congestion dampens the utility deriving from consumption, the provision of the
public good depends on agents’ incomes.
We have shown that an increase in the degree of intolerance towards immigrants has (as expected) a
negative impact on the optimal number of welcomed immigrants. Moreover, an increase in the degree of free
riding on optimal quotas is not univocal and depends on the substitutability between the private good and
the public good in natives’ consumption basket. Indeed, an increase in free riding entails less public good
provision; if goods are complements, a decrease in the public good implies a decrease in the marginal utility
of private consumption. Therefore, firms produce less private good and less immigrants workers are needed.
To the contrary, if goods are substitute, a decrease in the provision of the public good raises the marginal
utility of private good. This prompts to produce more private good, and thus, to hire (i.e., welcome) a larger
number of immigrants.
Before concluding, we need to spend a word of warning. Our work is meant to give a theoretical contri-
bution to the economic literature on immigration policies. To this purpose, we have limited our analysis to a
stylized picture of the reality. The policy implications of our work should be thus interpreted with caution.
Nevertheless, our analysis contributes to shed light on the current debate on immigration policies.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 Deriving the inverse function on the right-hand side of (19) and using (3), we
obtain
 = 
0 ()
 () =

1− 
 ()
0 () = −

1− 
 ()
1−  () (47)
Moreover  () does not depend on 2, thereby 2 = 0.
Focus now on (20). 1 is proportional to  (), then 1 =  . In addition, 1 depends linearly on 2,
thus 12 = 1.
Consider (21). 1 is proportional to  (), then 1 =  . Moreover 1 depends linearly on 2, thus12 = 1.
Finally, we derive (22) with respect to  and 2. We find first
1 ≡ 1
1
 = 1 + 
0 () 0 ()  +  () 0 () + 0 () 0 ()
 ()  +  ()
= 1 +
0 ()
 ()
1 + 
0()
() +  
0()
()
()
()
1 +  ()()
= 1+ 
1 +  () +  () ()()
1 +  ()()
Replacing (3), (4), (5) and (47), and noticing that
 ()
 () =
1−  ()
 ()
we obtain the elasticity 1 in (24). Finally, we get
12 ≡ 21
1
2 = 1− 
2
1 + 2
that is the elasticity 12 in (24).
We observe that the signum of the elasticity of the individual provision of public good with respect to the
tax rate is positive (1  0) if and only if   ¯ . The right-hand side in (25) is always positive and, under
Assumption 6, less than one.
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Proof of Proposition 6 If  = 1, then  = 1 and (42) writes
 ( ) ≡  [1− (1− ) ]−  (1− )
The roots of  ( ) are ∗ and
2 ≡ 1 + (1− ) 
2
+
s∙
1 + (1− ) 
2
¸2
− 
We notice that 0  ∗  2 if the discriminant is positive.
Let us introduce two critical values for :
1 ≡ 1− 11− 1
[(1− ) ]2
2− (1− ) + 2p1− (1− ) 
2 ≡ 1− 11− 1 (1− ) 
We observe that 0  1  2  ∗ because (1− )  ∈ (0 1). In addition:
(i) the discriminant of ∗ and 2 is positive if and only if   1 or   ∗,
(ii) ∗  1 if and only if   2.
We have three cases.
(a1) 0    1. The discriminant is positive. Then,  ( )  0 if and only if   ∗ or   2.
However,   2 implies ∗  1. Since   1, we obtain  ( )  0, that is 2  0: opening borders is
optimal.
(a2) 1    ∗. In this case, the discriminant is negative. Then,  ( )  0, that is 2  0:
opening borders is still optimal.
(b) ∗  . The discriminant is positive and 0  ∗  2. Thus,  ( )  0 if and only if ∗    2.
In other terms, 2  0 if   ∗; 2  0 if ∗    2; 2  0 if 2  . Then ∗ locally
maximizes the welfare . Moreover, ∗  1 because   2.
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